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Why Victory Trumps the Greater Good in American Politics
Recent years have seen a paradox develop in the public’s attitude towards politics – while they
are against legislative gridlock; they are unwilling to compromise on getting what they want out of
politics.  In new research, Lilliana Mason investigates the trend towards ideological ‘sorting’,
where people identify more with the political party that matches their ideological identity. She
finds that while party identification may be becoming stronger, divisions on specific issues are still
relatively small. She writes that that while people may agree on many issues, their ‘social
polarization’ on partisanship means that they dislike and distrust one another, making political
compromise difficult. 
In a December Pew Poll, 71 percent of Americans believed that a failure of Democrats and Republicans to work
together would harm the nation “a lot.” And on a number of issues, Democrats and Republicans generally agree
on what should be done. For instance, majorities of both parties think the minimum wage should be increased and
that background checks on gun purchases should be required. Unfortunately, neither side wants their own party to
compromise to solve the nation’s problems. As Pew reports, “both liberals and conservatives define the optimal
political outcome as one in which their side gets more of what it wants.” This is a paradox in which gridlock is
seen as dangerous, while its causes are fully supported by American partisans.
Why would Americans oppose gridlock and compromise at the same time? My new research provides some
clues. Mainly, I found that American political identities are capable of driving a powerful tribal loyalty, particularly
when they are very strongly aligned. I call this “social polarization,” and it is defined by intolerance, anger, and
heightened political activity, even in the absence of issue-based disagreements. In other words, when partisan
and ideological identities are lined up, partisans behave in more team-based ways, even if they agree on
substantive issues.
Democrats in American politics have grown more liberal and Republicans have grown more conservative since
the 1970’s. This is what political scientists generally refer to as “sorting”. However, this ideological sorting doesn’t
simply mean that Republicans and Democrats disagree more than before. In fact, Americans can more strongly
identify with the groups “liberal” and “conservative” without actually being very extreme in their issue positions.
And this is what has been occurring in American politics.
For instance, drawing on data from the American National Election Studies, Figure 1 shows increasing levels of
strong partisanship and partisan-ideological sorting, while Figure 2 shows that issue positions simply haven’t
increased to the same degree, whether measured as the average extremity of 6 issue positions, or the constraint
(ideological consistency) between them.
Figure 1 – Partisan Strength and Sorting, 1972–2008 (0–1 scale)
Figure 2 – Mean Issue Extremity and Constraint, 1982–2004 (0–1 scale)
The alignment between party and ideological identities is causing American partisans to behave in ways that are
more tribal than rational. Even when we agree on policy outcomes, we feel prejudiced against and angry at our
opponents, and we want our team to win.
One way to show this is to use a “matching technique” that essentially chooses individuals that are as similar as
possible on a large number of attributes, and then tests the effect of one small change. In my research, I matched
individuals on their issue positions as well as their education, age, sex, race, location, religiosity, and ideological
identity. The only thing I allowed to move was how well their partisanship lined up with their ideological identity.
Figure 3 shows the difference in levels of social polarization between these people who are largely identical in
everything including issue positions, but different in their level of sorting.
Figure 3 – Mean Social Polarization: Matching on Issue Positions and Ideology
Note: Data from the American National Election Studies. Bars represent 95 percent
confidence intervals.
In “thermometer bias” (the difference between feelings toward the two parties), “like bias” (the difference between
the number of likes and dislikes mentioned for each party), political activism, and anger at the opposing
presidential candidate, these identical people who agree on most issues are all much more biased and angry, and
slightly more active, when they simply hold a well-aligned set of partisan and ideological identities. They agree on
issues, and are quite similar demographically, but they truly dislike and distrust each other.
The story behind this unreasonable behavior is in fact much more logical than it seems at first glance. My
research is heavily influenced by some long-standing research in social psychology that explains the origins of
this apparently paradoxical behavior. In the late 1960’s, social psychologist Henri Tajfel and his colleagues ran a
series of experiments in which they randomly gave subjects meaningless group labels (ie. overestimators and
underestimators). They then asked the subjects to allocate money in one of two ways. Either everyone receives
the maximum amount, or their own group receives less than the maximum, and the other group receives even
less than that.
Tajfel expected most subjects to choose the common good of the whole over team victory, particularly because
these were meaningless groups with no prior conflict between them. He was wrong. He was surprised to find that
when people are given a choice between the greater good and team victory, “it is the winning that seems more
important to them.”
Again and again, in every conceivable iteration of this experiment (and there have been many), people privileged
the group to which they had been randomly assigned, often at the expense of the population as a whole. One
experiment even found that people rated their own meaningless group as good and the other group as bad faster
than they could consciously know what they were doing. We want our group to win, and that desire happens in the
blink of an eye.
Why are group labels, even meaningless ones, so powerful? Because being part of a group helps us to
understand who we are and how we fit into our world. We are hard-wired to feel like losers if our group loses, and
to feel like winners if our group wins. We are also hard-wired to avoid feeling like losers at all costs.
Now take those meaningless group labels and make them meaningful. Call them Democrats and Republicans. It
turns out that those eye-blink reactions to group labels apply to Democrats and Republicans too. Even worse, call
them Liberal Democrats and Conservative Republicans. When social identities converge, social psychology
research shows that prejudice, intolerance, and anger result. The more our identities converge, the less we like
outsiders, and the more important our groups become to us.
All of the political arguments over Obamacare, taxes, and abortion (but also minimum wages and background
checks) are built on a base of automatic and primal feelings that compel us to believe and to demand that our
group is the best, regardless of the content of the discussion.  A partisan prefers his or her own team partly for
rational, policy-based reasons, but also for primal, involuntary, self-defense reasons. These latter reasons are not
petty, they are very natural protective mechanisms. Unfortunately, this can cause unreasonable behavior and an
oversized emphasis on the goal of victory. As our identities grow more sorted, the more likely we are to exhibit this
primal behavior.
Reasoned policy opinion and blind victory-chasing have always been the angel and the devil sitting on the
shoulders of American voters. The relative power of each has fluctuated over time. But as our partisan and
ideological identities have converged, team spirit has pulled ahead of policy attitudes in driving American politics.
Until our political identities weaken or fall out of alignment, American partisans will continue to choose victory over
the greater good, even at the expense of their own interests.
This article is based on the paper ‘“I Disrespectfully Agree”: The Differential Effects of Partisan Sorting on Social
and Issue Polarization’, in the American Journal of Political Science.  
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